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Summary
Recent announcements of increases in private nongroup 
insurance premiums for 2010 that were many times the 
national rate of health care cost growth have attracted 
attention from the Obama administration, Congress, and 
the press. Several employer benefit specialists predict 
smaller but sizable increases in employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) premiums in the near future. Health care 
cost growth is a factor, but the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary and others 
project that the rate of cost growth will slow through 2010 
as a result of the recession. In this report, we examine the 
effects on coverage, costs, and small employer decisions 
to offer insurance under different scenarios for general 
increases in individual and ESI premiums. We begin with 
a baseline scenario for 2010, in which premium increases 
from the preceding year are driven by rates of cost growth 
projected by CMS. We then simulate two scenarios in which 
premiums rise at a significantly faster rate than baseline 
premium growth: an intermediate scenario in which ESI 
premiums increase 6 percent for large firms, 10 percent for 
small firms, and 20 percent in the individual market, and 
the largest increase scenario, with ESI premiums rising 9 
percent for large firms, 20 percent for small firms, and 30 
percent in the individual market.
The analysis finds that, relative to the baseline, the 
simulated premium increases would:
• Result in 1.9 million Americans becoming uninsured with 
intermediate premium increases and 3.3 million with the 
largest increases;
• Affect low- and middle-income persons the most because 
of losses of private coverage; there would be reductions 
in private nongroup coverage for this group of more than 
15 percent with intermediate increases and more than 20 
percent with the highest increases. 
• Cause as many as 1.3 million older, nonelderly persons (45 
to 64) to lose coverage, an increase of 10.2 percent in the 
uninsured among this group; 1.4 million younger adults 
(18 to 44) also lose coverage, an increase of 4.7 percent in 
the uninsured;
• Lead to some adverse selection in the private nongroup 
market; those losing nongroup coverage due to the 
premium increases above those in the baseline would 
have substantially lower costs on average than those 
retaining their coverage. Large premium increases can 
themselves create the need for future premium increases 
above the overall rate of health care cost growth as 
healthier individuals drop coverage and the average cost 
of the remaining insured increases;
• Raise overall health care spending by $18.1 billion with 
intermediate premium increases and by $38.6 billion with 
the highest increases; 
• Pressure employers to either decrease their premium 
contributions or pay most of the additional costs due 
to premium increases above the growth of health care 
costs. If premium contribution rates do not change, total 
health care spending by employers would increase by 
$13.5 billion (3.1 percent) with intermediate premium 
increases and $27.3 billion (6.4 percent) with the  
highest increases;
• Reduce the number of small firms offering insurance to 
their workers. For firms with less than 10 workers, the 
highest premium increases would cause the ESI offer rate 
to drop by more than 10 percent.
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Introduction
Recent announcements of increases in 
private nongroup insurance premiums 
for 2010 that were many times the 
national rate of health care cost growth 
have attracted attention from the Obama 
administration, Congress, and the press.1 
Several employer benefit specialists 
predict smaller but sizable increases in 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) 
premiums in the near future.2 In this 
report, we examine the effects of such 
premium increases on coverage, costs, 
and the decisions by small firms to offer 
ESI. Most attention paid to this issue has 
focused on the justifiability of specific 
increases. That is not our purpose here. 
We focus on the effects, which we model 
as national premium increases in excess 
of the growth in national health care cost. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) actuaries and others 
project that the rate of cost growth will 
slow through 2010 due to the recession 
(see Methods below). Indeed, 2008, the 
latest year of available data, saw a record 
low increase in health costs.3
We simulate two alternative scenarios 
that introduce national premium 
increases significantly higher than 
those resulting from CMS projections of 
medical costs. The premium increases 
that have gotten the most attention 
recently are those of large insurers in a 
single state, but insurers in many states 
have recently announced similarly large 
increases.4 Many people are concerned 
that this could become a general trend. 
Even the largest nongroup premium 
increases we simulate are somewhat less 
than the headline-grabbing increases 
announced by some insurers. Large 
increases in some places would likely be 
offset by smaller increases elsewhere, 
but the overall average premium would 
still increase at a much higher rate than 
health care costs. Also, some recently 
projected increases in ESI premiums 
were, in fact, national in scope.5
 We begin with a baseline in which 
premium increases from 2009 to 
2010 are driven by increases in health 
care costs and projected changes in 
economic and demographic factors. 
For example, CMS projects that per 
capita National Health Expenditures 
(NHE) will grow by 3 percent from 
2009 to 2010. Given the lag between 
claims and insurance policy renewals, 
we base premium increases from 2009 
to 2010 on the per capita NHE growth 
from 2008 to 2009, projected to have 
been 4.8 percent. This baseline is then 
compared to simulations using two 
higher premium growth scenarios for 
2009 to 2010: 
1.   Intermediate premium increases: 
ESI premiums increase 6 percent for 
large firms, 10 percent for small firms, 
and 20 percent for the nongroup 
(individual) market. Underlying health 
care cost increases and other changes 
from 2009 to 2010 are assumed to be 
the same as in the baseline. 
Table 1. 2010 Coverage by Income (Nonelderly, in millions)
Income Group
Employer Sponsored
Private
 Non-group
Public Coverage Uninsured
Total
Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change
Intermediate premium increases: 6% large firm ESI, 10% small firm ESI, 20% private nongroup
Less than 133% FPL  6.5  0.0  0.0%  3.0  -0.5  -16.7%  27.0  0.1  0.4%  19.6  0.4  2.0%  56.1
133-399% FPL  48.6  -0.2  -0.4%  5.5  -0.9  -16.4%  21.2  0.2  0.9%  22.0  0.9  4.1%  97.3
400% FPL or more  95.1  -0.2  -0.2%  6.3  -0.4  -6.3%  6.1  0.0  0.0%  7.8  0.6  7.7%  115.3
Total  150.2  -0.5  -0.3%  14.8  -1.8  -12.2%  54.3  0.4  0.7%  49.4  1.9  3.8%  268.7
Largest premium increases: 9% large firm ESI, 20% small firm ESI, 30% private nongroup
Less than 133% FPL  6.5  -0.1  -1.5%  3.0  -0.7  -23.3%  27.0  0.2  0.7%  19.6  0.6  3.1%  56.1
133-399% FPL  48.6  -0.6  -1.2%  5.5  -1.1  -20.0%  21.2  0.2  0.9%  22.0  1.5  6.8%  97.3
400% FPL or more  95.1  -0.7  -0.7%  6.3  -0.5  -7.9%  6.1  0.0  0.0%  7.8  1.2  15.4%  115.3
Total  150.2  -1.4  -0.9%  14.8  -2.3  -15.5%  54.3  0.4  0.7%  49.4  3.3  6.7%  268.7
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: Premium increases are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2010, and estimates are for that single year.
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2.   Largest premium increases: ESI 
premiums increase 9 percent for large 
firms, 20 percent for small firms, 
and 30 percent for the nongroup 
(individual) market. Underlying health 
care cost increases and other changes 
from 2009 to 2010 are assumed to be 
the same as in the baseline. 
Adverse selection caused by the 
recession is often asserted as a cause 
for sharp premium increases. While 
the Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM) does simulate many 
recession effects, it cannot capture 
certain employment effects. We do 
not simulate the labor market and the 
specific characteristics of jobs being 
lost or employers going out of business. 
Job loss could potentially cause adverse 
selection not captured in our results. 
However, it would not necessarily do so.6 
Methods
To estimate the effects of the premium 
scenarios, we use the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model.7 HIPSM simulates the decisions 
of businesses and individuals in 
response to policy changes, such as 
Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for the 
purchase of health insurance, and 
insurance market reforms. The model 
provides estimates of changes in 
government and private spending, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specific reforms.8
In this analysis, we focus on changes 
from 2009 to 2010 assuming no change 
in health policy from current law before 
health reform; our scenarios differ 
only in the premiums private insurers 
charge. Among individuals, families, and 
employers, the responsiveness of health 
insurance decisions to changes in health 
insurance options and premiums are 
calibrated in HIPSM to findings in the 
empirical economics literature.9
To obtain a current baseline, we grow 
the coverage estimates from 2004 to 
2008 given actual changes in coverage 
and population growth between 
2004 and 2008, as measured by the 
CPS. To reflect worsening economic 
conditions between 2008 and 2010, 
we apply estimates from Holahan and 
Garrett to estimate the impact of higher 
unemployment rates on changes in 
health insurance coverage over that 
period.10 For health spending, we use 
the changes in the National Health 
Expenditure accounts, including 
projections for 2009 and 2010 by the 
CMS Office of the Actuary.11
Results
Coverage by Income Group
In table 1, we show the impact on 
coverage of the two alternative 
premium increase scenarios. The results 
are shown for three different income 
groups: those with incomes below 133 
percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL), those with incomes between 133 
and 399 percent of the FPL, and people 
with incomes reaching 400 percent 
of the FPL or more.12 The pattern of 
Table 2. 2010 Coverage by Age (Nonelderly, in millions)
Income Group
Employer Sponsored
Private
 Non-group
Public Coverage Uninsured
Total
Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change Baseline
Difference 
after 
increase
Percent 
change
Intermediate premium increases: 6% large firm ESI, 10% small firm ESI, 20% private nongroup
Children, < 18  37.9  -0.1  -0.3%  3.0  -0.3  -10.0%  28.5  0.0  0.0%  6.9  0.4  5.8%  76.3
18 - 44  60.9  -0.2  -0.3%  6.8  -0.7  -10.3%  14.4  0.1  0.7%  29.8  0.8  2.7%  111.9
45 - 64  51.3  -0.1  -0.2%  5.0  -0.7  -14.0%  11.5  0.0  0.0%  12.7  0.8  6.3%  80.5
Total  150.2  -0.5  -0.3%  14.8  -1.8  -12.2%  54.3  0.4  0.7%  49.4  1.9  3.8%  268.7
Largest premium increases: 9% large firm ESI, 20% small firm ESI, 30% private nongroup
Children, < 18  37.9  -0.4  -1.1%  3.0  -0.5  -16.7%  28.5  0.2  0.7%  6.9  0.7  10.1%  76.3
18 - 44  60.9  -0.6  -1.0%  6.8  -0.9  -13.2%  14.4  0.1  0.7%  29.8  1.4  4.7%  111.9
45 - 64  51.3  -0.4  -0.8%  5.0  -1.0  -20.0%  11.5  0.1  0.9%  12.7  1.3  10.2%  80.5
Total  150.2  -1.4  -0.9%  14.8  -2.3  -15.5%  54.3  0.4  0.7%  49.4  3.3  6.7%  268.7
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: Premium increases are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2010, and estimates are for that single year.
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coverage changes is similar for both 
scenarios, so we concentrate on the 
largest premium increase to illustrate 
the results. 
Low-income groups would have the 
greatest loss in private insurance—
counting both employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) and nongroup 
insurance. For the two lowest income 
groups, there would be losses of about 
1 percent in ESI coverage, but more 
than 20 percent in nongroup coverage. 
Overall, there is a decline of 1.4 million 
persons with employer-sponsored 
insurance, mostly in the middle and 
highest income groups. Since there 
is much less ESI coverage among the 
lowest income group, there is much 
less to lose. Another 2.3 million people 
would lose private nongroup coverage, 
about 15 percent relative to the baseline. 
Of this, 700,000 are in the lowest 
income group and 1.1 million in the 
middle-income group. Finally, there 
would be an increase of 3.3 million 
uninsured Americans, a roughly 7 
percent increase relative to the baseline. 
Of this, 600,000 are in the low-income 
group, 1.5 million are in the middle-
income group, and 1.2 million are in 
the highest income group. The highest 
income group has the largest increase in 
percentage terms, just over 15 percent. 
Changes in Coverage by Age
Table 2 shows the effect of increases 
in premiums on three age groups: 
children under 18, adults ages 18 to 44, 
and adults ages 45 to 64. As with table 
1, the pattern is the same across both 
premium increase scenarios, so we 
focus on the largest premium increase. 
ESI coverage declined in a relatively 
uniform way across all age groups, by 
about 1 percent. A large share of the 
decline in private nongroup coverage is 
among those ages 45 to 64, which fell 
by 20 percent. In this age group, 1.0 
million fewer Americans had nongroup 
coverage under the higher premium 
growth scenario compared to the 
baseline scenario. Nongroup coverage 
among younger adults declined by 
900,000 (a 13 percent reduction). The 
remaining 500,000 person decline in 
nongroup coverage with the higher 
premium growth was among children, a 
17 percent drop. 
More children picked up public 
coverage in response to the higher 
premiums than did other groups. As 
a result, there was an increase of only 
700,000 uninsured children. Increases 
in public coverage offset less of the 
decline in private coverage for both 
adult categories, since public program 
eligibility is much more limited for 
adults under current law before health 
reform. Thus, there was an increase 
of 1.4 million in the number of 
uninsured young adults and 1.3 million 
more uninsured older adults due to 
the higher premiums. In percentage 
terms, the increase in the uninsured 
was substantially higher in older than 
younger adults—10.2 versus 4.7 percent, 
since many more young adults were 
uninsured to begin with. 
Changes in Coverage and Average 
Health Care Costs
In table 3, we examine some of the 
transitions in coverage from the 2010 
baseline to the scenarios with increased 
premiums. For those with baseline 
nongroup coverage, by far the most 
common change in coverage is becoming 
uninsured. Much smaller numbers 
respond to premium and cost increases by 
either enrolling in Medicaid or purchasing 
Table 3. 2010 Average Costs of the Nonelderly by Selected Coverage Changes
Coverage at 
 Baseline
Coverage under premium 
scenario
Intermediate Premium Increases Largest Premium Increases
Persons Average Total Costs Persons Average Total Costs
Private Nongroup
Employer Sponsored 395,000 2,624 542,947 2,427
Private Non-group 12,739,651 2,414 12,015,164 2,427
Public Coverage 247,242 2,204 297,764 2,334
Uninsured 1,426,964 1,117 1,953,971 1,032
Employer Sponsored
Employer Sponsored 148,950,492 4,198 147,821,564 4,195
Private Non-group 219,016 4,256 381,979 3,072
Public Coverage 369,575 3,425 412,113 3,412
Uninsured 676,681 1,648 1,599,999 1,789
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: Premium increases are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2010, and estimates are for that single year.
* Average insured cost for the uninsured is uncompensated care
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ESI coverage instead. Those deciding to 
drop nongroup coverage and become 
uninsured (about 2 million under the 
largest increase) have noticeably lower 
costs than those keeping their policies, 
$1,032 versus $2,427, under the largest 
premium increase. Thus, the premium 
increases will induce some adverse 
selection, and the largest increase will 
produce the most adverse selection. 
This will be mitigated somewhat by new 
nongroup enrollees who lost offers of ESI 
coverage (about 382,000 under the largest 
increase). These people have significantly 
higher costs on average ($3,072 under the 
largest increase) than those who would 
stay in nongroup coverage. 
Most people with ESI coverage in the 
baseline stay with that coverage. We see 
that, as with nongroup coverage, those 
becoming uninsured have on average 
lower health costs than those remaining. 
However, this is such a small percentage 
of the ESI market that adverse selection 
would be insignificant overall.
Table 3 does not include those in the 
baseline who are either uninsured or 
have public coverage since very few 
of these change their coverage type in 
response to the premium increases.
Aggregate Costs 
Next, we examine the effects of 
premium increases on overall health 
care costs (table 4). Government costs 
increase only slightly because the 
increases in public coverage that would 
occur as a result of the higher premiums 
are relatively small. Because there 
are more uninsured, uncompensated 
care costs increase by $2.7 billion 
(4.2 percent) in the largest premium 
increase. Employer spending increases 
the most, $27.3 billion (6.4 percent), 
under the largest increase; because 
employers pay a substantial share of 
workers’ premiums, they are greatly 
affected by the premium increases. 
With higher premiums, fewer workers 
enroll in ESI, but the resulting decrease 
in employer costs is outweighed by the 
higher prices paid on behalf of those 
workers still enrolling in ESI. Total 
individual spending increases by $7.8 
billion (2.4 percent) under the largest 
premium increase. This relatively small 
increase occurs because those with 
ESI—a large majority of insured—are 
generally paying only a small fraction 
of the full premiums.13 Those who 
enroll in Medicaid see spending decline 
and those who become uninsured use 
less health care and thus have lower 
spending. The intermediate premium 
increase results in an increase of $18.1 
billion in health care spending. In the 
higher premium increase scenario, the 
increase is $38.6 billion. The premium 
increases that we analyze reduce 
coverage and increase overall health 
care spending. 
Small Firm Offer Rates
Finally, we examine employer offer rates 
by small firms, defined as those with 
fewer than 50 workers (figure 1). The 
largest premium increases result in a 
decline of offer rates by 3.5 percentage 
points among firms with fewer than 
10 employees relative to the baseline; 
a change of about 10 percent. In firms 
with between 25 and 49 workers, offer 
rates decline by 2 percentage points or 
2.5 percent. Large-firm offer rates (not 
shown) decline very slightly.
Discussion
In summary, our analysis finds that, 
relative to the baseline, the simulated 
premium increases would result in 1.9 
million Americans becoming uninsured 
with intermediate premium increases 
and 3.3 million with the largest 
increases. The loss of private coverage 
would fall most heavily on low- and 
middle-income persons; there would 
be reductions in private nongroup 
coverage for this group of more than 15 
percent with intermediate increases and 
more than 20 percent with the highest 
increases. Under the highest premium 
increases, 1.3 million older, nonelderly 
persons (age 45 to 64) would lose 
coverage, an increase of 10.2 percent in 
the uninsured among this group. And 
1.4 million younger adults (18 to 44) also 
lose coverage, an increase of 4.7 percent 
in the uninsured. 
The premium increases would lead 
to some adverse selection in the 
private nongroup market; those losing 
Figure 1.  ESI Offer Rates for Small Firms
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0
<10
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increase
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Source: Urban Institute analysis HIPSM 2010
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nongroup coverage due to the premium 
increases above those in the baseline 
would have substantially lower costs 
on average than those retaining their 
coverage. Large premium increases 
can themselves create the need for 
future premium increases above the 
overall rate of health care cost growth 
as healthier individuals drop coverage 
and the average cost of the remaining 
insured thus increases. 
The simulated increases would raise 
overall health care spending by $18.1 
billion with intermediate premium 
increases and by $38.6 billion with the 
highest increases. Employers would 
be pressured to either decrease their 
premium contributions or pay most of 
the additional costs due to premium 
increases above the growth of health 
care costs. If premium contribution 
rates do not change, total health care 
spending by employers would increase 
by $13.5 billion (3.1 percent) with 
intermediate premium increases and 
$27.3 billion (6.4 percent) with the 
highest increases. Finally, the number 
of small firms offering insurance to 
their workers would be reduced in both 
scenarios. For firms with fewer than ten 
workers, the highest premium increases 
would cause the ESI offer rate to drop 
by more than 10 percent.
Regardless of their cause, premium 
increases greatly in excess of the 
national rate of growth for health 
care costs should concern employers, 
who could bear up to three-quarters 
of the resulting financial burden. We 
find little overall loss of employer 
coverage; rather, employers make 
higher contributions to health 
insurance. This could lead many to 
reduce the share they contribute to 
their workers’ premiums or to lower 
the comprehensiveness of the insurance 
packages offered.14 
Those who purchase in the nongroup 
market are most affected. On average, 
there is a decline of 15.5 percent in 
nongroup coverage, with reductions 
of over 20 percent for low- and middle-
income Americans. Those over age 45 are 
also particularly affected adversely. Those 
purchasing ESI could pay higher costs 
than simulated here if their employers 
reduce premium contributions.
Considering individuals and families, 
premium increases like those considered 
here would have a noticeable effect 
even on those with high incomes, but 
would have the most harmful impact on 
families below 400 percent of the FPL 
and persons age 45 to 64. Individuals and 
families would spend almost $8 billion 
more on health care under the highest 
premium growth assumptions.
Government and health providers 
are also affected. Increases in private 
insurance premiums do, in fact, result 
in higher government costs by leading 
people to drop coverage and enroll in 
public programs or become uninsured. 
The largest premium increases 
simulated would add $3.5 billion dollars 
in uncompensated care and Medicaid/
CHIP spending. In sum, large premium 
increases, such as those recently 
announced and projected, would 
seriously exacerbate the problems all 
health care payers currently face and 
ultimately increase costs for hospitals 
and health care providers.
Table 4. 2010 Health Care Spending of Government, Employers, Families 
and Uncompensated Care (in billions)
Intermediate Premium 
Increases
Largest Premium 
Increases
Total Government Spending (federal + state)
 Baseline  $277.7  $277.7
 Medicaid/SCHIP After Increase  $278.3  $278.5
 Net Change After Increase  $0.6  $0.8
 % Change After Increase   0.2%   0.3%
Uncompensated Care
 Baseline  $63.9  $63.9
After Increase  $65.3  $66.6
 Net Change After Increase  $1.4  $2.7
 % Change After Increase   2.2%   4.2%
Employer Spending
 Baseline  $429.7  $429.7
After Increase  $443.2  $457.0
 Net Change After Increase  $13.5  $27.3
 % Change After Increase   3.1%   6.4%
Individual and Family Spending
 Baseline  $315.0  $315.0
After Increase  $317.6  $322.8
 Net Change After Increase  $2.6  $7.8
 % Change After Increase   0.8%   2.5%
Aggregate Change  $18.1  $38.6
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Note: Premium increases are modeled as if they were fully implemented in 2010, and estimates are for that single year.
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